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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for 
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their 
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and 
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San 
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support for 
four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of 
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The purpose of this paper is to describe the role of the Middle East and Northern 
Africa within the “Euro Time Zone” (ETZ). The highly stylised concept of the 
ETZ takes account of the deep-rooted change in the international monetary 
system, which was caused by the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999. As 
a result only three major international currencies exist today, the US-Dollar, the 
euro and the Japanese Yen. Each of the three major currencies has already 
developed, or has the potential to develop, a “gravitation zone”, i.e. an area 
comprising those countries, in which the major currency plays a special role and 
which are characterised by particularly close relations with the economic area 
issuing this currency.
This phenomenon is most reflected concerning the US-Dollar so far. 
Latin-America could be considered as a “Dollar Time Zone”, as the US currency 
is widely used in all functions of an international currency.* 1 Even outright 
“dollarisation”, i.e. the introduction of the US-Dollar as a legal tender, seems to 
be an attractive option for a growing number of countries.2 In Asia, the picture is 
less clear so far, as the US-Dollar plays a crucial role alongside the Yen, and for 
both economic and political reasons it is an open question whether the Yen 
could grow into the role the US-Dollar plays for Latin America. Nevertheless, in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis there are signs of a growing disassociation from 
the US-Dollar and moves to further regional monetary integration, e.g. the 
Chiang Mai agreement.3
Concerning the euro, it is obvious that the new currency has not yet been 
able to exploit its full potential as an international currency given its short 
history. Nevertheless, a number of regions can be identified, whose common 
denominator is - in spite of their diversity - closeness to the euro area in various 
respects, and which therefore can be considered as part of the Euro Time Zone. 
Roughly speaking, the ETZ comprises the area that is more strongly influenced 
by the EU and its policies than by the policies of other major economies,
This paper was presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research 
Meeting, Florence, March 21-25, 2001, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
1 These functions are: investment/financing currency, payment/vehicle currency,
pricing/quotation currency (private use), and reserve currency, intervention currency, pegging 
currency (official use); (ECB 1999, 32).
2 Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador are dollarised, while in several other countries there is a 
debate about this option.
J The Chiang Mai agreement concluded in May 2000 between the ASEAN countries and 
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea foresees the establishment of a network of bilateral 
swap arrangements and repurchase agreements among the participating countries, the closer 



























































































especially the US and Japan. It could also be called the “European Hemisphere" 
and comprises roughly 100 countries. The ETZ is primarily determined in 
geographic terms, as geography also matters regarding economic, linanciul and 
political relations. The following regions outside the EU are considered here as a 
part of the ETZ: The 13 EU accession countries, other European countries 
(Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the European micro-states), the Balkans, the 
European CIS including Russia, the Middle East and Northern Africa and Sub- 
Saharan Africa. The focus in this paper is only on the latter four regions and 
particularly the Middle East and Northern Africa, as the issues arising with them 
from a euro area perspective are in many respects very different from those with 
the former group of countries.4 The ETZ could be defined as the zone, which -  
considering a set of economic, financial, institutional, geographical and 
historical criteria -  gravitates around the euro area, and for which the euro 
already is or will in all likelihood become the most relevant international 
currency.
The paper is organised as follows:
Section 1 highlights the reasons why from a euro area perspective particular 
attention should be paid to the countries belonging to the ETZ. Section 2 
presents a number of indicators, which point at multidimensional factors of 
closeness to the euro area, thereby underpinning the concept of the ETZ. Section 
3 briefly describes the ETZ in a global context. Section 4 focuses on the Middle 
East and Northern Africa as a part of the ETZ by describing key characteristics 
of the region and the major links to the euro area, particularly in the economic 
and financial field. Section 5 discusses selected economic issues, which are of 
mutual interest for both the euro area and ETZ countries.
1. Motives for a special focus on the Euro Time Zone (ETZ) from a euro
area perspective
The following stylised facts underline the special link between the euro area and 
the ETZ:
• Euro area banks are the most exposed to countries in the ETZ. Russia is a 
striking example with EU banks accounting for more than 80% of total 
exposures of BIS reporting banks to Russia.
4 This is due to the fact that with a few exceptions, e.g. the Balkans, countries from these four 
regions do not have a perspective for EU accession and thus accession specific issues do not 
play a role in relations with the EU. Secondly they distinguish themselves from the former 




























































































• Together with the EU, euro area States are the main official creditors of 
(most) ETZ countries (e.g. the EU is the biggest donor of non-military aid 
in the Middle East peace process).
• Some ETZ countries are the most important producers of oil, gas and 
other raw materials, on which the euro area depends. More than 75% of 
proven world oil reserves are located in the ETZ, the bulk of it in the 
Middle East.
Thus, given the possible spill-over effects of developments in the ETZ on the 
euro area, it is crucial for policy makers to deepen their knowledge on ETZ 
countries and their economies. On the other hand, the euro area is by far the 
most important region in the world for ETZ countries, e.g. as trading partner and 
source of financing. For instance, the euro area accounts for far more than 50% 
of the Maghreb countries’ external trade. ETZ countries have thus a vital interest 
in developments in the euro area and in a better knowledge of the euro.
As regards the single currency, there is a specific reason why a special 
focus on the ETZ is required: The ETZ is likely the area where the international 
role of the euro will grow most rapidly and most extensively. Already today, the 
euro plays a major role, e.g. in exchange rate regimes and foreign reserves of 
many ETZ countries. Given the close links to the euro area, the greatest 
potential for an increasing international use of the euro, including full 
euroisation in some cases, lies in the ETZ. Furthermore, it is necessary to deepen 
the knowledge of ETZ countries on European institutions and the euro. There is 
clear evidence of a significant information gap concerning EMU and the euro, 
which, inter alia, may hinder the building up of confidence in the new currency 
and thereby the use of the euro.
Finally, from a euro area perspective, it must be kept in mind that the regions 
neighbouring Europe tend to be politically fragile and less dynamic in economic 
terms than other parts of the world. Exporting stability in a broader political 
sense, but also in a narrower economic sense, including price stability, is in the 
vital interest of Europe. On the one hand, Europe will be more affected by 
political and economic crises in Russia or the Middle East than, for instance, the 
US. On the other hand, Europe will be the main beneficiary of political stability 
and prudent macroeconomic management that will boost economic growth in 
those regions. It goes without saying that greater stability and higher growth are 
not only in the interest of the euro area, but primarily in the interest of the 




























































































2. The concept of the ETZ: multidimensional factors of closeness to the 
euro area
A. Economic and financial indicators
Economic, monetary and financial variables are of primary importance to 
indicate the closeness of a given country to the euro area. The role of the euro in 
third countries’ exchange rate regimes is of particular interest from a monetary 
policy point of view and can take various forms, from the unilateral adoption of 
the euro or euroisation (e.g. in Montenegro5), to a float with the euro taken 
informally as a reference currency (see section 5.1. for the issues arising in this 
context). The choice of the euro as an anchor for exchange rate arrangements is 
often justified by the fact that the relevant third countries’ trade share with the 
euro area is significant.
Furthermore, the origin of financial flows to third countries, and in 
particular foreign direct investments (FDI), is an indicator that contributes to 
shape the concept of ETZ. The higher the share of third countries’ companies 
owned by euro area companies, the tighter is the integration with the euro area. 
Finally, with respect to the public sector, the share of euro area countries and the 
EU as creditors of third countries’ external debt reflects a direct linkage between 
the euro area and the financial conditions in third countries.
However, if only economic and financial indicators were taken into account, 
there would be the phenomenon of “ETZ countries outside the ETZ”. E.g. 
Argentina would be part of the ETZ since the euro area represents 17% of its 
exports (against 10% of the US); euro area banks account for 60% of 
international bank claims (against 20% of the US), while the euro area and the 
US are each at the origin of almost half of FDI flows to Argentina. Thus, the 
concept of the ETZ is not exclusively based on economic and financial 
indicators, but also looks at other dimensions of closeness to the euro area.
B. Geographic approach
This approach is contained in the word Euro Time Zone itself. It takes account 
of the fact that geography also matters for economic, financial and political 
relations. From Russia to South Africa, the countries located in the time zones 
close to that of the euro area belong to the ETZ. While the Northern, Southern 
and Western borders of the ETZ are well-cut, uncertainties appear with respect 
to the Eastern border of the ETZ. The Eastern frontier could be set so as to 
include Iran as part of the Middle East, Kazakhstan, Russia and all neighbouring
5 Montenegro belongs to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and is thus not a sovereign 




























































































countries to the Black Sea and all those which are west of the Caspian Sea. 
Given that 80% of Russia’s population lives west of the Ural Mountains, this 
country clearly is part of the ETZ.6
C. Institutional and political co-operation
Since the important “wave of independence” of former colonies in the 1960s, 
the EU has developed a comprehensive policy of co-operation agreements with 
various regions of the world. Examples are the Barcelona-Process with 
Mediterranean countries and the Lome/Cotonou agreements with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The degree of institutional and political 
co-operation depends largely on the ties the ETZ countries concerned 
traditionally had with individual member states now forming the EU. This co­
operation includes financial contributions and loans, the level of which tends to 
reflect the importance of countries for the EU. In addition to institutional co­
operation directly related to the EU framework, the countries’ membership of 
regional organisations and fora, such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe, 
also highlights the political links to the EU.
D. Historical ties
Finally, the special relationship between euro area countries and ETZ countries 
is often based on ties rooted in history. E.g. the close monetary link between 14 
countries in Central and Western Africa forming the CFA franc zone, which 
have a fixed parity to the euro, is basically explained by these countries’ colonial 
past and the special relationship they preserved with France after their 
independence.
3. The ETZ in a global context
The Euro Time Zone in a comprehensive sense, including the EU, comprises 
29.2% of the world population and more than one third of world GDP (36.4%, 
Table 1). The contribution of the different regions of the European hemisphere 
to these overall shares of population and GDP however, are rather unbalanced. 
The euro area alone accounts for 21.3% of world GDP and thus for almost 60% 
of the European hemisphere’s GDP. This clearly points to the fact that from an 
economic perspective, the ETZ gravitates around the euro area. The four regions 
Balkans, European CIS, Middle East and Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan
6 In any event, this definition is somewhat arbitrary, since for instance Turkmenistan has not 
been included, whereas Kazakhstan is considered as part of the ETZ here, while both 
countries border the Caspian Sea. The inclusion of Kazakhstan into the ETZ is justified 
primarily by its close links to Russia, since one-third of its population is Russian and Russia 




























































































Africa make up only 5.4% of world GDP; their combined share is even smaller 
than that of the EMU “Pre-ins”.7 But those regions account for 20.1% of the 
world’s and more than two-third of the European hemisphere’s population. This 
imbalance of GDP and population shares reflects the sharp contrast in the level 
of economic development between the euro area and some wealthy European 
countries surrounding it on the one hand, and the other ETZ regions on the other 
hand.
Table 1: Euro Time Zone - Population and GDP 1999*
ETZ-region Population
Mill.
In % of world 
population
GDP Bill. US$ In % of world 
GDP
Balkans** 24.4 0.4 31.0 0.1
Russia 146.5 2.4 375.3 1.3
Other
European CIS
97.1 1.6 95.4 0.3
MENA*** 301.4 5.0 770.3 2.6
Sub-Saharan
Africa
642.9 10.7 333.2 1.1
Sum 1,212.3 20.1 1,605.2 5.4
Accession
countries




11.9 0.02 414.2 1.4
Sum ETZ 1,394.2 22.9 2,587.4 8.7
Memorandum:
Euro area 293.3 4.9 6,396.9 21.3
Pre-ins 83.8 1.4 1,924.7 6.4
ETZ incl. EU 1,771.3 29.2 10,909.0 36.4
World 6,000.0 - 30,000.2 -
* For countries, whose 1999 GDP data were not available, data for previous year up to 1996 have been used. 
** GDP data for Balkans without Yugoslavia
*** GDP data for Middle East and North Africa (MENA) without Iraq 
Source: World Bank
4. The Middle East and Northern Africa
The following countries are covered in this paper as Middle Eastern and North 
African: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza), 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Yemen.
7 In 1999, Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the UK have been “Pre-ins”, i.e. EU members that 



























































































4.1. Some key characteristics of the region
The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) is a very heterogeneous region in 
terms of population and wealth (Table 2), but also with regard to political 
structure. With more than 60 million inhabitants, the most populated countries 
are Iran and Egypt, contrasted by eight countries with a population of less than 
five million. GNP per capita ranges from 350 US$ in Yemen to 19,020 US$ in 
Kuwait. Oil resources are the major determinant for wealth in the region and are 
distributed unevenly across countries. As a general pattern, the less populated 
countries are those, which produce oil, and are better off than countries with a 
large population. This constellation creates migration pressure both within 
MENA and from several MENA countries to Europe. With the exception of 
some small oil producing countries, Israel is the only high income country with 
a development level similar to Europe (Table 3), reaching approximately three 
quarters of the euro area average GNP per capita and thereby a higher level than 
some euro area member states. Looking at the overall GDP, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Israel and Egypt are by far the largest economies in the region. In contrast to 
other ETZ regions, e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA is not characterised by high 
debt levels (Table 4). Growth performance in the region is very diverse, but 
generally less dynamic than in other key emerging markets (Table 5), and 
regional integration is low.
Table 2: Population, GDP and GNP per capita in MENA




GNP per capita 
1999, US$ (rank)
Algeria 30.0 (3) 47.0 (6) 1,550 (14)
Bahrain 0.7 (18) 5.3* (16) 7,640* (5)
Egypt 62.4 (2) 92.4 (4) 1,400 (16)
Iran 63.0 (1) 101.1 (2) 1,760 (ID
Iraq 22.8 (5) n.a. - 1,750+ (12)
Israel 6.1 (10) 99.1 (3) 17,450 (3)
Jordan 4.7 (12) 7.6 (14) 1,500 (15)
Kuwait 1.9 (16) 19.6 (9) 19,020*** (1)
Lebanon 4.3 (13) 17.2* (11) 3,700 (9)
Libya 5.5 (11) n.a. - 5,500+ (V)
Morocco 28.2 (4) 35.2 (7) 1,200 (17)
Oman 2.3 (15) 15.0* (12) 4 940**** (8)
Palestinian Terr. 2.8 (14) 3.6 (17) 1,610 (13)
Qatar 0.8 (17) g 2** (13) 12,000**** (4)
Saudi Arabia 21.4 (6) 128.9* (1) 6,910* (6)
S\na 15.7 (8) 19.4 (10) 970 (18)
Tunisia 9.5 (9) 21.2 (8) 2,100 (10)
1 A 1 2.8 (14) 47.2* (5) 17,870* (2)
'i emen 170 (7) 6.8 (15) 350 (19)
• 1‘r ts  •• W  ••• 1996 -----1995




























































































According to the World Bank definition of country income groups, the bulk of 
MENA countries falls into the lower middle income category (Table 3), having 
reached higher income levels than Sub-Saharan Africa, which is pre-dominantly 
low income, and levels comparable to most Balkans and European CIS 
countries.8









Yemen Algeria, Egypt, 









(GNP per capita < 755 US$) 
(GNP per capita 756-2995 USS) 
(GNP per capita 2996-9265 US$) 
(GNP per capita > 9266 US$)
* Low income:
Lower middle income: 
Upper middle income: 
High income:
Source: World Bank
With regard to indebtedness, MENA countries are classified by the World Bank 
as follows:







Not classified by 
indebtedness










* Standard World Bank definition, which combines a range of indicators like present value of debt service to 
GNP and to exports.
Source: World Bank
Indebtedness is thus not a prevailing problem in MENA as a whole, as only 
three countries are classified as severely indebted.
8 In this context it is worth noting however, that several European CIS countries meanwhile 
have declined to low income levels, e.g. Ukraine with a GNP per capita of 750 US$ (World 




























































































Table 5: Growth rates in MENA countries
Country/Region Average growth 1982-91 
Annual rates in per cent
Average growth 1992-99 













Palestinian Terr. n.a. n.a.
Qatar -1.5 7.9








Latin America 1.8 3.2
USA 3.0 4.1
Euro area 2.7 1.6
Source: IMF WEO October 2000
The data on growth performance exhibit a wide dispersion and volatility of 
growth rates within MENA (Table 5), which is partially explained by political 
events, wars and civil wars (e.g. Kuwait, Lebanon) and also reflects the 
dependence of many countries on primary commodity and agricultural exports. 
The growth rate of the largest economy of the region, Saudi Arabia, is 
remarkably low. Although growth in several countries has been considerable in 
the past 18 years, they have not reached the dynamics of other emerging 
markets, particularly in Asia. It should also be noted that population growth is 
high in many countries of the region. Thus GNP per capita has stagnated or even 
decreased in a number of countries (Most remarkably in Syria, from 1,210 US$ 
in 1995 to 970 US$ in 1999).
MENA is characterised by a low degree of regional integration so far 
(Table 9, section 4.2.1.). The only exception is the flow of labour, mainly from 
































































































fcv  a .  O
flow is' facilitated by a common language, culture and religion. There are several 
__ ns'exjfilaining the low degree of regional integration (de Vaseoncelos 21100
O, 7ff^®-Apan, Fischer 1996 8f., Giovanetti 1999.12f.): Political conflict-. ami< r)
■̂ /fiyialrigs, a high dependence of government revenues from taritts. due to a weak 
fiscal basis9, as well as similar factor endowment and production structures, 
which limit the scope for intra-regional trade. Given the low basis, the potential 
for regional integration is nevertheless great.
A framework for political and economic integration in the region is the 
Arab League, which comprises 22 Arab states. Within the Arab League the Arab 
Monetary Fund fosters monetary cooperation. However, the Arab framework 
does not include Israel and Iran, two major players in the region, and suffers 
from a lack of political coherence. For instance, plans launched by the Arab 
League in 1997 to establish an all Arab Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) by 2008 
have not led to substantial results so far regarding the agreed tariff cuts (Calleya 
2000 26 f.). Other frameworks for regional integration are the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia) which has not 
achieved much progress due to political conflicts either, and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates). The GCC, so far the most successful framework for 
regional integration, intends to establish a customs union in 2005, and the GCC 
economic agreement includes a reference to an “endeavour to establish a unified 
currency”. At the GCC summit in Bahrain on 1 January 2001 Gulf leaders 
launched an initiative to live up to this objective. The Monetary Agencies and 
Central Banks Governors’ Committee and the Financial and Economic 
Committee of the GCC were asked to work out a plan and a timetable for a 
monetary union to be presented to the next GCC summit in December 2001.
4.2. Major links to the euro area
MENA constitutes an important part of the Euro Time Zone for several reasons:
• Geographic proximity: MENA countries are the immediate neighbours of the 
euro area in the South and South East. Proximity generates a number of links 
and issues, which are of mutual interest for both the euro area and the 
countries of the region. Migration is such an issue. Income in many MENA 
countries is relatively low, and many countries exhibit high population 
growth. E.g. the populations of the most populous countries in North Africa, 
Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, are expected to grow until 2025 by 44%, 70% 
and 39%, respectively (Eurostat 2000a, 20). This results in migration 
pressure to neighbouring Europe, which can particularly be felt in Southern




























































































European countries that have become countries of immigration. A high 
number of people, whose nationality or ethnic origin is Middle Eastem/North 
African, is already living in the EU, also reflecting historical ties (e.g. 
Algerians in France). Instability is another issue. Due to the unresolved 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also to conflicts and rivalries among Arab 
states, MENA as a region is characterised by an inherent political instability, 
which repeatedly resulted in armed conflicts. Europe has an overwhelming 
interest to contribute to stability in this neighbouring region, which is 
mirrored in the fact that the EU is the biggest donor of non-military aid to the 
Middle East peace process. Instability in the region has, inter alia, an impact 
on oil prices, as the oil crises in the 1970s and even developments in the 
second half of 2000 have demonstrated.
• Oil supply: MENA includes some of the most important oil producing 
countries like Saudi-Arabia and Iran, and almost 70% of proven oil reserves 
are concentrated in the region. This highlights the importance of MENA for 
Europe (see section 5.2.).
• Historical ties: European history has been intertwined with the region for 
more than two millennia. The Middle East is the birthplace of the three 
monotheistic religions that have strongly influenced European culture; the 
Roman Empire included almost the whole region and most countries have 
been European colonies. In the long common history, periods of fruitful 
exchange on the one hand and of tensions or even armed conflict on the other 
hand followed each other. Although traditional ties to Europe are strong, US 
influence in the region is prominent in several areas, particularly in political 
and security matters (e.g. the US role in the Middle East peace process and in 
military protection for Gulf countries).
• Special relationship with the EU: In 1995 the EU and 12 Mediterranean 
countries launched the Barcelona-Process10, which is aimed at creating a new 
framework for Euro-Mediterranean partnership. It comprises the EU and the 
following 12 Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. 
The three main topics of the Barcelona Process are: (i) Political and ^ecurity 
Partnership, (ii) Economic and Financial Partnership, (iii) Partnership in 
social, cultural and human affairs. One of the objectives of the Barcelona- 
Process is to create a Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area (target date: 
2010). Furthermore, it aims at promoting “South-South”-trade, given the low 
level of regional integration. The EU has a special programme, MEDA, to 
finance projects in the Mediterranean countries; to which 3,4 bill, euro were




























































































allocated 1995-1999 and 5,35 bill, euro for 2000-2006. Furthermore, loans 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB) are an important source of 
financial assistance to Mediterranean countries (EUR 7.4 billion available for 
2000-2006). According to most analysts, the Barcelona-Process has not 
fulfilled expectations so far, which is e.g. reflected by the low rate of 
disbursements from the MEDA programme (26% of the amount committed 
1995-1999), the slow progress in setting in force Association Agreements 
and the difficulties encountered in drafting a regional Charter for Stability 
and Security. The heterogeneity of the 12 partners involved in the process 
both in political and economic terms is a major problem. Moreover, the 
unresolved Middle East conflict is an impediment for the Euro- 
Mediterranean dialogue. The Barcelona-Process is, however, the only 
framework so far, where Israeli, Syrian and Lebanese officials meet at 
ministerial level. Currently the EU plans to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership (European Commission 2000b 2ff), which has been one of the 
objectives of the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign 
Ministers held in Marseille in November 2000.
• Economic links: Economic ties between the euro area and MENA as a whole 
and with most of its countries are intense. Looking at the institutional side, 
EU-Association agreements have entered into force with 4 Mediterranean 
countries (Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Palestinian Territories), agreements with 
2 countries (Egypt, Jordan) have been concluded, but not ratified yet, and 
negotiations on Association agreements have been launched with another 3 
countries (Algeria, Lebanon, Syria). Furthermore, the EU has a cooperation 
agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council since 1989.
Given the focus of this paper, the economic and financial ties between the euro 
area and MENA are investigated in more detail here, focusing on trade, bank 
claims and FDI. The following stylised facts emerge:
- The euro area-MENA relationship is characterised by an asymmetry: While 
the euro area is the major partner for MENA as a whole and for most of its 
countries, MENA’s importance for the euro area is limited. This asymmetry, 
which can also be observed for the other ETZ regions, reflects the different 
economic weight of the two areas, underpinning the concept of the ETZ as 
the region gravitating around the euro area.
- The relatively largest relevance of MENA for the euro area lies in its role as 
a trade partner; nevertheless with 6.9% its overall share in euro area foreign 
trade only slightly exceeds that of Switzerland, and is lower than the share of 
EU accession countries. Bank exposure and FDI flows are not significant 




























































































- Economic links to the euro area are much stronger than ties with the US for 
MENA as a whole and for most countries.
- A distinction can be made within MENA between the Mediterranean 
countries and the Arab Peninsula. Mediterranean countries are in many 
respects closer to the euro area than countries on the Arab Peninsula. For the 
latter ties to the US and to Asia are important as well, besides those to the 
euro area.
Key countries in the region are Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Maghreb 
countries Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and Iran. Egypt is the largest Arab 
country and traditionally a leader in the Arab world. Israel is by far the 
economically most advanced country and the euro area’s most important trade 
partner in the region. Saudi Arabia is the world’s biggest oil producer and the 
only country of the region in the G 20. The Maghreb countries have particularly 
close economic ties to the euro area. With 63 million people, Iran has the largest 
population in the region besides Egypt, is an important oil producer and a 
country with traditionally close ties to Europe.
4.2.1. Trade
Looking at individual MENA countries’ trade with the euro area and comparing 
these data with those for the US and with intra-regional trade, the importance of 
the euro area as a trade partner, while generally high and exceeding that of the 
US, varies considerably among individual countries (Table 6).
The ranking in Table 7 allows to identify 3 groups of countries, which exhibit 
a clear geographical pattern:
- Countries with an overwhelming orientation to the euro area. (> 50). These 
are the North African countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia), whose 
trade links with the euro area are even closer than those of some member 
countries with the euro area itself (e.g. 44% of German exports go to and 
43% of imports come from the euro area). Within the ETZ, only accession 
countries and some Balkan countries have similarly close trade relations with 
the euro area.
- Countries for whom the euro area is clearly the dominant trading partner (SO­
SO). This group includes the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean (Egypt, 
Lebanon, Israel, Syria) and Iran and Iraq.
- Countries with less intensive trade links (< 30), namely the countries on the 




























































































Reversing the perspective by ranking MENA countries with regard to their 
importance as trade partners for the euro area also shows interesting results 
(Table 8).
The euro area’s importance to MENA countries as a trade partner is reflected by 
the euro area’s trade share (Table 7).

















Algeria 59 59 1 2 15 5
Bahrain 2.5 34 8 13 3 14
Egypt 32 30 18 6 12 14
Iran 28 33 5 8 0 0
Iraq 36.5 40 n.a. 7 n.a. 1.5
Israel 23 37 0.5 0.2 35.5 20
Jordan 9 30 36 13 2 9
Kuwait 12 24 1 15 14 12
Lebanon 16 46 41 11 6 7
Libya 81 53 4 12.5 0 0
Morocco 58 57 3.5 5 5 5
Oman 0.5 16 18 34.5 1 6
Qatar 3 24 4 13 4 10.5
S. Arabia 14 23 11 7.5 17 19
Syria 53 32 25 6 2.5 3.5
Tunisia 80 71 6 5 0.5 3.5
U.A.E. 4 25 11 8 2 9
Yemen 1 22 4 23 1 7
Exports and imports in percent of a country’s overall exports/imports 1999.
Without Palestinian Territories, euro area includes Greece here and in the following tables on trade. 




























































































Table 7: Importance of euro area as trade partner to MENA countries
(Euro area trade share 1999* ) _______________________________ _



















* Trade share: Export share + import share (sum of columns 2 and 3 in table 6), divided by two.Without
Palestinian Territories
Source: IMF DOTS, own calculations
Table 8: Importance of individual MENA countries as trade partner to euro area
(Exports and imports in million US$ 1999)_______________ ________________ __ >
Country Euro area exports 
to ...
Euro area imports 
from ...
Exports+Imports
Israel 11.574 6,048 17,622
Tunisia 7,194 5,801 12,995
Algeria 5,726 7,215 12,941
Saudi Arabia 6,507 6,421 12,928
Morocco 6,731 4,711 11,442
U.A.E. 8,235 1,070 9,305
Libya 2,278 6,391 8,669
Iran 3,900 4,236 8,136
Egypt 4,762 1,139 5,901
Iraq 610 3,194 3,804
Syria 1,695 1,923 3,618
Kuwait 1,796 1,228 3,024
Lebanon 2,642 128 2,770
Jordan 1,128 114 1,242
Bahrain 947 175 1,122
Qatar 904 165 1,069
Oman 734 40 774
'i emen 573 19 592
Without Palestinian leiritones 




























































































The five most important trading partners are Israel, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi 
Arabia and Morocco. Israel’s leading position is remarkable and reflects the 
country’s high GDP per capita compared to the region, in combination with its 
EU Association. Israel has a particularly outstanding position as the euro area’s 
most important export market in the region, making up 17% of all euro area 
exports to MENA. Its share in euro area overall exports is, nevertheless, small 
with roughly 1%. This points to the fact that, from an euro area perspective, 
MENA as a whole plays only a limited role as a trading partner (Box 1).
Box 1: MENA share in euro area overall trade
MENA share in euro area exports: 7,7% 
MENA share in euro area imports: 6,1%
The low level of regional integration in MENA is clearly mirrored in the 
region’s intra-regional trade figures, if they are compared to trade with the euro 
area and the US (Table 9). Only 7% of MENA exports and imports go to or 
come from the region. This is a significantly lower value compared to other 
regions, e.g. Asia or Latin America (El-Arian, Fischer 1996, 8). For only three 
MENA countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Oman), the share of intra-regional trade 
exceeds 20%, for another four countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Yemen) this 
share is between 10% and 20%. Israel is the country with least intra-regional 
trade." It is also obvious that the euro area is a far more important trading 
partner to the region than the US, particularly on the import side.
Table 9: MENA trade with the euro area and the US compared to intra-regional trade
(Exports/imports in percent o f overall MENA exports/imports 1999)
Euro area US MENA
MENA exports to ... * 25 12 7
MENA imports from 35 11 7
*Without Iraq and Palestinian Territories 
♦♦Without Palestinian Territories 
Source: IMF DOTS, own calculations
The relative importance of the euro area grows, if the Arab Peninsula is 
excluded from MENA (Table 10). Mainly oil is exported from the Arab 
Peninsula, and the major market for Gulf oil is Asia. Thus, for those countries 
trade links with Asia are considerably more intense than for the rest of MENA. 1
11 Derived from data in table 6. As IMF DOTS data are used here for the purpose of 
comparability, the Palestinian Territories are not included. As, according to Palestinian 
sources, more than 80% of West Bank and Gaza trade is with Israel, the Palestinian 
Territories would have the economy most integrated into the region, due to the specific 
political circumstances. Israel’s intra-regional trade would also be slightly higher, although it 




























































































Table 10: MENA without Arab Peninsula: trade with the euro area and the US 
compared to intra-regional trade
(Exports/imports in percent o f overall MENA without Arab Peninsula exports/imports 1999)
Euro area US MENA
MENA exports to ...* 43 14 5
MENA imports from ...** 43 10 5
*Without Iraq and Palestinian Territories 
**Without Palestinian Territories 
Source: IMF DOTS, own calculations
For this MENA sub-region, the euro area’s role as the major trading partner is 
by far more significant than for the region as a whole. The euro area’s share of 
ex- and imports outpaces that of the US about three-times and four-times, 
respectively. Intra-regional trade is even somewhat more limited in this sub- 
region. This is due to the low intra-regional trade share of Israel and the 
Maghreb countries and the more advanced integration in the framework of the 
GCC. Saudi Arabian exports make up almost one quarter of MENA overall 
exports, and 15% of imports. Given Saudi Arabia’s relatively low share of 
exports to the euro area, its exclusion explains the particular dramatic increase in 
the euro area’s share in exports, if MENA without Arab Peninsula is compared 
to MENA as a whole.
4.2.2. International bank claims
Another cmcial link between MENA and the euro area are bank claims. To 
illustrate this link from a euro area perspective the claims of euro area banks to 
MENA and individual countries in the region are exhibited and compared with 
claims of US banks (Table 11). From a MENA perspective it is useful to look at 
the total bank liabilities of individual countries and the respective shares of euro 
area and US banks (Table 12).
It is evident that euro area banks are the dominant source of international 
bank financing for MENA countries, far ahead of US banks, which only play a 
minor role. This is in line with data for the other regions forming the ETZ. The 
role of euro area banks is particularly dominant (> 70%) in Syria, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Morocco and Iran. Two countries, Saudi Arabia and Israel, make up 
more than half of all US claims. Euro area claims are more evenly distributed in 
the region, the most important countries being Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, 
Algeria, Egypt and Israel. From a euro area perspective, with a share of 2.1% of 
all international bank claims, MENA plays only a minor role. This reflects again 
the asymmetry in the financial links between the two regions, given the 
importance of euro area banks as financing source in most countries. For US 




























































































Table 11: Claims of euro area and US banks to MENA
Q1 2000________________________________________
Claims to ... Euro area banks US banks
Mill. US$ % of total 
claims
Mill. US$ % of total 
claims
Algeria 4,715 0.21 228 0.03
Egypt 4,683 0.21 495 0.07
Iran 6,926 0.31 6 0
Iraq 913 0.04 41 0.01
Israel 4,109 0.18 1,580 0.23
Jordan 719 0.03 103 0.02
Kuwait 2,274 0.1 546 0.08
Libya 120 0.01 n.a. n.a.
Morocco 5,989 0.27 261 0.04
Oman 1,943 0.09 144 0.02
Palestinian Territories 2 0 n.a. n.a.
Qatar 3,606 0.16 228 0.03
Saudi Arabia 6,467 0.29 3,273 0.48
Syria 498 0.02 0 0
Tunisia 2,486 0.11 115 0.02
U.A.E. 1,839 0.08 266 0.04
Yemen 374 0.02 0 0
Sum: MENA 47,663 2.1 7,286 1.1
No data for Bahrain, Lebanon. Source: BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics
Table 12: International bank liabilities of MENA
Q1 2000________ __________________________
Country Total liabilities, 
Mill. US$
To euro area banks, 
in percent of total
To US banks, in 
percent of total
Algeria 5,499 85.7 4.1
Egypt 7,315 64.1 6.8
Iran 9,250 74.9 0.06
Iraq 1,382 66.1 3.0
Israel 8,234 49.9 19.2
Jordan 1,247 57.7 8.3
Kuwait 6,174 36.8 8.8
Libya 287 41.8 n.a.
Morocco 7,079 84.6 3.7
Oman 3,455 56.2 4.2
Palestinian Terr. 58 3.5 n.a.
Qatar 6,166 58.5 3.7
Saudi Arabia 17,667 36.6 18.5
Syria 573 86.9 0
Tunisia 2,907 85.5 4.0
U.A.E. 5,758 31.9 4 6
Yemen 739 506 0
Sum: MENA 83,790 56.9 ~S 7




























































































4.2.3. Foreign Direct Investment
Concerning FDI flows to MENA, the respective roles of the euro area and the 
US are reversed (Table 13).
Table 13: FDI flows to MENA 1995-1999
Mill. ECU ___________
Sub-Region From euro area From US Total inflow
Gulf* 1,155 1,982 8,483
Iran 494 0 193
Israel 750 1,556 2,444
Maghreb** 1,059 1,777 3,622
Mashreq*** 120 678 1,217
Sum: 3,578 6,002 15,959
As data availability for individual countries is limited, sub-regions are displayed here.
* Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, U.A.E., Yemen
** Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
*** Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria
Without Lebanon and Palestinian Territories
Source: Eurostat, own calculations
US FDI flows to the region in the observed period exceeded those originating in 
the euro area. However, with regard to geographic origin of FDI, it should be 
noted that 5,346 Mill. ECU were invested in the Gulf region from “Pre-in’-EU 
countries. This explains the comparatively large gap between US plus euro area 
FDI on the one hand and overall FDI flows to MENA in general and that for the 
Gulf countries in particular. Looking at the overall sums invested in the region, 
it becomes evident that MENA so far has not succeeded in attracting significant 
FDI. E.g. in 1999, South Africa alone has attracted FDI which were almost three 
times as high as flows to MENA as a whole. It is also worth noting that more 
than half of all FDI flows to MENA went to the Gulf region. Israel attracted 
about 15% of FDI. This underlines in particular the weakness of the rest of 
MENA, including the most populated countries, with regard to FDI.12
5. Selected ETZ issues related to the euro
A range of issues concerning the ETZ is of interest from a monetary and 
financial point of view. Most concern the international role of the euro. For 
instance, while Europe is MENA’s most important trading partner, this has so 
far not been reflected by the use of European currencies in trade invoicing. 
Instead the US-Dollar has been the most widely used currency in bilateral trade 
(Chauffour, Stemitsiotis 1998, 15ff). Thus there is a great potential for the euro 
to be increasingly used as invoicing currency in bilateral trade between the euro 
area and MENA. Another topic of interest is whether the euro will gain ground




























































































as an invoicing currency in intra-regional MENA trade and MENA trade with 
third countries outside the region. So far, there is no reliable and comprehensive 
data available on the use of the euro as an invoicing currency since its 
introduction two years ago. Furthermore, the use of the euro as an investment 
and financing currency is an important issue. Although the euro area is the major 
source of financing for e.g. MENA, almost 40% of the region’s long term debt 
(1998) is denominated in US-Dollar. The D-Mark and French franc together 
make up only 15%, the other national currencies of euro area countries are 
negligible in this context (World Bank 2000b, 197)13.
Other issues of interest are bank exposure and financial stability (of 
relevance with regard to e.g. Russia, of less relevance with MENA) as well as 
migration and its economic impact on both the emigrant and immigrant 
countries. Two issues are discussed in the following in more detail: Monetary 
and exchange rate policies as they are the core function of central banks, and 
energy supply and invoicing on commodity markets, as MENA plays a 
particularly important role in this respect within the ETZ.
5.1. Monetary and exchange rate policies
Given the close economic and financial ties to the euro area, the euro’s role in 
ETZ countries’ exchange rate regimes is likely to increase. This role is already 
evident today. On the whole, 31 out of 81 ETZ countries in the Balkans, the 
European CIS, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa manage exchange rate 
arrangements at present including a reference to the euro.14 A reference to the 
euro does not necessarily imply a strong and effective euro orientation in the 
exchange rate policy of a country; for instance the euro may represent only a 
small percentage in a currency basket dominated by the US-Dollar (e.g. Israel), 
or a currency may be formally pegged to the SDR, but de facto follow the US- 
Dollar (e.g. Saudi Arabia). But also a stronger and effective euro orientation can 
be observed in many ETZ countries, ranging from euroisation over currency 
boards based on euro and conventional pegs to managed floats, with the euro as 
the main reference currency. However, a number of countries, for which the 
euro area is a more important economic partner than the US, pursue a US-Dollar 
oriented exchange rate policy (Table 14). This holds particularly true for
13 The World Bank’s definition of MENA in this statistics is different from that used in this 
paper; Israel, Kuwait, Qatar and U.A.E. are excluded, while Malta and Djibouti are included 
by the World Bank. This does not change however, the overall picture.
14 “These arrangements are mainly a legacy of past links to the former national currencies of 
the euro area countries. In the future, the euro can be expected to gain further importance as a 
reference or anchor currency for the more than 80 countries located in what could be called 
the “European Hemisphere”, i.e. the European, Mediterranean and African regions.” (Padoa- 
Schioppa 2000, 24). If the ETZ in a comprehensive sense is observed, the number of regimes 




























































































MENA, where external anchors are widely spread, with the US-Dollar as the 
pre-dominant choice (Table 15). Egypt for instance maintains a US-Dollar peg, 
although trade with the euro area is twice as high as trade with the US.
Pegs to currencies, which only represent a small share of foreign trade, 
may prove to be problematic. Developments in Argentina in late 2000/early 
2001 can serve as an example. However, other determinants than the direction of 
trade have to be taken into account as well, when choosing an exchange rate 
anchor: e.g. the invoicing currency of trade and the level as well as the 
denomination of foreign debt.
Table 14: Exchange rate regimes in selected ETZ countries
Exchange rate 
regime
Against euro Against US-Dollar
Currency board Estonia, Bulgaria Lithuania
Conventional fixed 
peg
CFA franc zone,* 
Macedonia, 
Morocco (b)
Egypt, Iran, Saudi - 
Arabia
Crawling pegs Tunisia (b)
Crawling bands Israel (b)
Managed float Croatia Algeria, Belarus, 
Nigeria, Ukraine
Free float Albania, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, 
South Africa
* Special arrangement, see footnote 16.
(b): peg to currency basket, where euro or US-Dollar plays dominant role. 
Source: IMF
A possible re-orientation of exchange rate policies in ETZ countries with a 
growing role of the euro as an anchor currency is an issue of mutual interest for 
the countries concerned and the euro area. For countries that have pegged their 
currency to the euro or to a basket with a dominant weight of the euro, the 
ECB’s monetary policy is of immediate interest given its impact on domestic 
monetary and economic conditions. For the ECB, a growing role of the euro as 
an anchor currency might e.g. impact the exchange rate channel of monetary 
transmission (ECB 1999 41 ff.). Furthermore, it might trigger an increasing 




























































































Two peculiar monetary and exchange rate regimes, which exist in the ETZ, 
and only in the ETZ, have to be monitored with particular attention:
- euroisation
- special monetary arrangements with euro area authorities (CFA franc 
zone)
Euroisation as the unilateral introduction of the euro as legal tender, as recently 
realised in Montenegro and Kosovo, may develop into an option chosen by 
countries in the ETZ under certain conditions: Given the close ties to the euro 
area, the euro is the “natural candidate” as a legal tender, if a country in the ETZ 
comes to the conclusion that introducing a foreign currency is the only option to 
gain monetary credibility. This option is undetpinned by the circulation of 
banknotes of euro predecessor currencies in several countries, particularly in the 
Balkans. The prospect of euroisation is enhanced by the fact that many ETZ 
countries are small, and several of them are politically fragile and in the past 
have from time to time been confronted with hyper-inflation due to political 
crises, wars or civil wars. In such an environment, in which it is hardly possible 
to gain market reputation for a national currency, the introduction of a stable 
foreign currency as a legal tender might seem to be a viable option to stabilise 
the domestic economy. Experiences with dollarisation in the Western 
Hemisphere (Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama) are likely to influence whether 
euroisation will become more widely spread in the ETZ.13
Special monetary arrangements with the euro area like the CFA franc 
zone also deserve particular attention.16 Given a relatively successful economic 
performance of the current 14 CFA members, it cannot be ruled out that there 
will be requests to enlarge this zone to other African countries or to establish 
similar arrangements elsewhere in the ETZ. *16
13 For an overview of the economic implications of dollarization see Berg, Borensztein 2000 3
ff.
16 This zone comprises 14 members: 8 West African countries -Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo-, which form the “Communauté 
financière de l’Afrique” (CFA), and 6 Central African States -Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, 
members of the “Coopération financière africaine” (CFA). Two regional central banks issue 
the currencies, which have the same parity against the French franc (at present 100 CFA franc 
= 1 French franc). The two African monetary areas are governed by inter-State agreements 
built on two principles: (i) free capital flows between France and the two CFA franc regions 
are ensured and exchange control regulations are harmonised; (ii) the French treasury 
guarantees the convertibility of the CFA franc into French francs through the availability of 
(in principle) unlimited liquidity in French francs, when required. The guarantee of the French 




























































































Besides exchange rate arrangements, the evolution of monetary policy 
and monetary policy frameworks in ETZ countries is an interesting issue. 
Although there is evidence that the trend to greater price stability has also struck 
roots m most of the ETZ, many countries still exhibit comparatively high 
inflation rates. In this context, central bank independence is a crucial issue. 
Central bank independence is a spreading feature of monetary frameworks in 
industrialised and democratic countries. As many countries in the ETZ are 
neither industrialised nor fully fledged democracies, the political and 
institutional environment for central bank independence still has to be 
developed. (Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, Sterne 2000, 99f.). It remains to be 
seen whether the model of the ECB as an independent central bank with a clear 
mandate for price stability is conducive to sharpening the awareness for the 
benefits of price stability and central bank independence in the ETZ regions 
gravitating around the euro area.
Table 15: Exchange rate regimes in MENA
Country Exchange rate regime
Algeria Managed float with US-Dollar as main reference currency
Bahrain Officially peg to SDR with fluctuation band of +1-1.25%, de 
facto peg to US-Dollar
Egypt Peg to US-Dollar
Iran Dual exchange rate, official rate pegged to US-Dollar
Iraq Peg to US-Dollar
Israel Crawling fluctuation band (asymmetric band of currently 
44%) against currency basket (Units of each currency in 
basket: USD 0.6698, EUR 0.2493, GBP 0.0453, JPY 7.2411)
Jordan Officially peg to SDR, de facto peg to US-Dollar
Kuwait Officially peg to adjustable basket, de facto peg to US-Dollar. 
fluctuation band of +/-1.5%
Lebanon Tightly managed float against US-Dollar
Libya Peg to SDR with wide fluctuation band, de facto managed 
float with US-Dollar as reference currency
Morocco Peg to currency basket, composition is not disclosed, euro has 
likely replaced US-Dollar as most important currency in 
basket in 1999
Oman Peg to US-Dollar
Qatar Officially peg to SDR with fluctuation band of +1-1.25%, de 
facto peg to US-Dollar
Saudi Arabia Officially peg to SDR, de facto peg to US-Dollar
Syria Multiple exchange rate, official rates pegged to US-Dollar
Tunisia Crawling peg to currency basket, composition is not 
disclosed, euro likely the most important currency in basket, 
real exchange rate objective
U.A.E. Officially peg to SDR with fluctuation band of +1-1.25%, de 
facto peg to US-Dollar
Yemen Free float




























































































As regards monetary policy and its framework, ETZ countries could, to some 
extent, draw on the experiences of EU accession countries. Some ETZ countries 
(European CIS, Balkans) are also transition economies, and some of them could 
at some point in time be granted the status of accession country. But even for 
those non-European ETZ countries, for whom EU membership is not an option, 
there seem to be similarities with accession countries regarding the challenges 
for monetary and exchange rate policy, central bank independence and 
disinflation (e.g. monetary policy strategy and conduct in the absence of a 
developed financial market infrastructure, weak banking systems, the choice of 
external or internal anchors, establishing central bank independence in a difficult 
institutional environment, gaining central bank credibility without track 
record).17
Table 16: Inflation in MENA






Algeria 10.7 27.8 8.0
Bahrain 0.7 1.5 0.7
Egypt 18.4 12.7 5.4
Iran 18.0 33,0 20.2
Iraq n.a. n.a n.a.
Israel 108.5 11.3 7.7
Jordan 5.4 3.3 3.3
Kuwait 4.0 1.3 1.7
Lebanon 80.2 35.8 5.3
Libya 7.7 16.6 8.5
Morocco 6.8 5.5 1.9
Oman 1.6 0.8 0.0
Palestinian Terr. n.a n.a. n.a.
Qatar 3.3 1.6 3.7
Saudi Arabia n.a. 1.5 -0.2
Syria 21.8 9.6 2.1
Tunisia 8.3 5.2 3.3
U.A.E. 4.0 5.1 2.2
Yemen n.a. 61.8 16.1
Memorandum:
Africa 19.5 44.0 16.2
Asia 9.7 12.2 5.7
Latin America 163.0 145.3 13.6
USA 4.1 2.9 2.3
Euro area 5.4 3.5 1.6
Consumer prices.
Source: IMF WEO October 2000
17 Similarities between Israel and several accession countries regarding the challenges for 
monetary and exchange rate policies in a process of disinflation are particularly striking 




























































































When looking at price stability in MENA, it becomes evident that countries 
have made considerable progress in reducing inflation rates (Table 16). In most 
countries, average inflation in the past four years is below the rates in previous 
periods, particularly compared to the 1980s. Two countries, which experienced 
hyperinflation in the past, Israel and Lebanon, have achieved a remarkable 
stabilisation. Also Egypt and Syria were successful in bringing down 
comparatively high inflation rates. The Gulf countries have managed to maintain 
more or less stable prices over the whole period considered here. In contrast, 
Iran is a country with a persistently high inflation rate. Also Yemen, Libya and 
Algeria exhibited relatively high price increases still in the past four years.
5.2. Energy supply and invoicing
The ETZ is crucial with regard to world energy supply (Table 17). Currently, 
50% of oil and almost 40% of natural gas production come from three ETZ- 
regions, MENA, European CIS and Sub-Saharan Africa. Their importance will 
even increase in future, as more than 75% of proven oil and gas reserves are 
concentrated in those regions. In contrast, reserves in the major oil and gas 
consuming regions, North America and Europe, are significantly below their 
present share of production. For the euro area, it is worth noting that the UK and 
Norway only command small reserves. These are currently two significant oil 
and gas suppliers, which are geographically close and politically stable. In the 
medium term their share in Europe’s energy supply will likely decrease and 
have to be replaced by other sources.
According to EU Commission estimates, the EU’s dependence on oil 
imports, which is already high at 75% of its oil supplies in 2000, is likely to 
increase further and exceed 85% in 2020.18 In 2020 40% of the world's oil 
production will come from the Persian Gulf alone (at present roughly 30%). The 
bulk of reserves, particularly of oil, is located in the Middle East, with Saudi 
Arabia alone accounting for 25% of proven reserves. Looking at natural gas, 
also Russia plays a major role. These data highlight the importance of the ETZ 
for Europe with regard to energy supply. Political and economic developments 
in those ETZ regions commanding large reserves of oil and gas will thus 
increasingly have a crucial impact on world energy prices going beyond the 
influence they have already today. Therefore they deserve particular attention, as 
price developments in the euro area are influenced considerably by oil price 
movements, although to a lesser extent than in the 1970s (ECB 2000. 2 Iff).
18 For a detailed analysis of medium- and long-term oil market developments and a proposed 




























































































Table 17: The role of the ETZ in oil and gas supply
Region Oil Natural Gas
Production Reserves Production Reserves
In percent of In per cent of In per cent of In per cent of
world total world total world total world total
MENA 35.4 69.5 12.4 38.5
Russia + 
European CIS
10.1 6.2 25.0 35.5
Africa (Sub- 
Sahara)
5.3 3.1 0.5 3.0
ETZ 50.8 78.8 37.9 77.0
Memorandum:
Europe 9.6 2.0 12.1 3.5
North 
America*
18.6 6.2 31.8 5.0
South/Central 
America
9.9 8.6 4.1 4.3
Asia/Pacific 11.1 4.4 14.1 10.2
* including Mexico
Data for end 1999, Reserves: Proved reserves 
Source: BP AMOCO, own calculations
The importance of the ETZ with regard to world energy supply is mirrored by 
the oil export dependency of many ETZ countries (Table 18).
Table 18: Oil export dependency of ETZ countries
Net oil exports in percent of 
total exports*
Countries
>90 Nigeria, Libya, Oman
80-89 Angola, Yemen, Kuwait, Rep. of Congo, 
Saudi Arabia
70-79 Iran, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea,
60-69 Syria, Algeria, Qatar
40-49 United Arab Emirates
30-39 Cameroon
20-29 Bahrain, Russia
* averaged over 1995-97 
Source: IMF WEO October 2000
The high, in some cases even extreme, oil export dependency in several ETZ 
countries however, does not only point to their crucial role as oil supplier. It also 
exhibits the lack of diversification of their economies, which makes them 
dependent on oil price movements.
The oil price increase during 1999 and 2000 and Us implications h>i the cum 




























































































contacts with major energy supplying countries. The European Commission has 
suggested to set up an ongoing dialogue with OPEC and its principal member 
states on oil market developments with the goal to achieve stable prices. Most of 
the important OPEC members are in the ETZ. In addition, energy related issues 
will likely play an increasing role in EU relations with Russia. At the EU-Russia 
summit in October 2000, the two sides agreed to develop a “EU-Russia energy 
partnership”.
A particularly interesting issue that has emerged with the introduction of the 
single European currency is the invoicing of oil in euro instead of US-Dollar.19 
Recently Iraq decided to replace the US-Dollar by the euro as invoicing 
currency for its oil exports. This move, although entirely driven by political 
considerations, has drawn attention to this issue. Two crucial questions arise in 
this context:
- Under which conditions would major oil producers, particularly Gulf 
countries, consider a move to invoicing their oil exports in euro?
- What would be the consequences of such a move for the euro area?
As regards the conditions, the network externalities of using only one currency 
in invoicing oil trade favour the status quo and impede a (partial or complete) 
switch to the euro. Given these network externalities, a “critical mass” is likely 
to be required to make such a switch conceivable.
As regards the consequences, oil trade in euro could be potentially advantageous 
for the euro area, as it could insulate the euro area from the effects of currency 
fluctuations in the dollar denominated oil price. As experienced in 2000, these 
effects can exacerbate the effects of rising oil prices. Nevertheless it should be 
noted that in times of an appreciating euro versus the US-Dollar, the effect of 
rising oil prices on import prices in the euro area could be dampened. The 
general effect would depend on the correlation between the dollar-euro 
exchange rate and the oil price. An analysis of this question is beyond the scope 
of this paper and could be a topic for future research.
It would be particularly interesting to investigate whether there is a natural 
“built-in-stabiliser” for the import price movements of a country, whose 
currency is used as an invoicing currency on oil markets. The reasoning is as 
follows: Rising oil prices imply a higher demand for the invoicing currency, 
currently the US-Dollar, as oil importing countries have to pay their increasing 
bill for oil in that currency, which c.p. tends to appreciate. The effect of such an 
appreciation tends to compensate partially for the higher import prices resulting 
from the initial oil price hike. Thus the inflationary impulse would be cushioned




























































































in the country, in whose currency oil trade is invoiced. In this context, it is also 
suggested that oil proceeds primarily are invested in US-Dollar denominated 
assets, as investors from oil producing countries, whose currencies are pegged to 
the US-Dollar, would thereby avoid a currency risk. In times of rising oil 
prices/revenues this recycling of “petro-dollars” might thus c.p. further 
strengthen the US currency and add to the “built-in-stabiliser”-effect on import 
prices. These effects are difficult to quantify however, and may overlap with 
various other factors determining the exchange rate (IMF 2000e, 31).
A move to invoicing oil, and possibly other commodities, in euro, might also 
have an impact on the exchange rate regimes of the exporting countries. 
Currently, the US-Dollar orientation of e.g. the Gulf countries is well explained 
by the fact that oil revenues, which constitute their main income flow from 
exports, are invoiced in US-Dollar. An increasing role of the euro as invoicing 
currency on commodity markets could thus also foster a re-orientation of 
exchange rate policies particularly in ETZ countries (see section 5.1.).
6. Concluding remarks
This paper highlighted the concept of the ETZ as the zone, which gravitates 
around the euro area, and for which the euro already is or will likely become the 
most relevant international currency. Moreover, it described the role of MENA 
within the ETZ. As the euro area is the world’s leading trade partner and second 
largest economic area, its single currency is likely to develop a gravitation zone 
similar to that of the US-Dollar, and traces of such a zone can already be 
detected. The concept of the ETZ particularly acknowledges that the 
implications of the euro might be stronger for regions neighbouring Europe like 
MENA than for the rest of the world. This seems to be the result of a complex 
interaction of economics, politics, geography and history, which certainly 
deserves future research. The relevance of the ETZ for the euro area and vice 
versa should be reflected in a particular attention of policy makers from both 
sides for developments in the respective regions. The euro could serve as a pole 
of stability in the economic gravitation centre of the ETZ. Furthermore, access 
to a large and integrated euro area financial market in their vicinity could be 
conducive to economic development in ETZ countries. It would then be up to 
each country to decide - according to its individual economic circumstances - 
how to make the best use of a stable euro in the different functions of an 
international currency.
Michael Sturm 
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